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1. – Introduction 
Europe has been struck by what is commonly described as a ‘migration crisis’.1 
The crisis has resulted in the upsurge of far-right and nationalist parties, supported 
by their voters’ fear and resentment of migrants.2 However, in the assessment of mi-
gration and the perception thereof, the jurisprudential pillar is commonly overlooked. 
 
* The author would like to thank Armin Khoshnewiszadeh for his research assistance. 
1
 CARDWELL, “Tackling Europe’s Migration ‘Crisis’ Through Law and ‘New Governance’”, Global 
Policy, 2018, p. 73 on the fact that migration is presented as a crisis, and less a humanitarian one than a 
security threat. Similarly: BOELES et al., European Migration Law, 2nd ed., Cambridge, 2014, p. 28. 
2
 Several studies suggest the existence of a link between integration policies and public opinion on 
immigrants. For an overview, see CALLENS, “Integration Policies and Public Opinion: In Conflict or in 
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This chapter aims to (partially) fill that gap by examining if and how the European 
regional courts contribute to the construction of a European identity, based on shared 
European values. It is in times of crisis that identity changes are most probable,3 but 
is this true for jurisprudence too? In taking a foremost human rights-based approach 
to analysing the treatment of migrants, this chapter seeks to advance knowledge and 
insight into the role of the European Court of Human Rights (‘ECtHR’) and, to a 
lesser degree, the Court of Justice of the European Union (‘CJEU’) for the construc-
tion of a (perceived) European identity. Based upon ostensible differences between 
‘us’ and ‘them’, this European identity is contrasted to the one of the ‘others’ from 
beyond Europe. 
The chapter will draw attention to the manner in which the European courts con-
tribute to the creation or reinforcement of a (perceived) Europeanness, which has a 
reciprocal impact on (foreign) policy considerations.4 The law and the jurisprudence 
of the regional European courts are highly effective tools to influence and change 
popular and political understandings of migration.5 While especially the ECtHR tra-
ditionally maintained a strong institutional standing, the Court does increasingly seek 
the approval of its constituencies, the State Parties, and can therefore not be viewed 
as isolated from the political forces, among other populism and increasing national-
ism, surrounding it.6 
The chapter will, among other, scrutinize the language used in judgments of the 
European courts in their discussion of migration.7 There are some indications that the 
ECtHR attaches a positive connotation to migration from within Europe, consistent 
 
Harmony?”, LISER Working paper No. 2015-02; ALSTON, “The Populist Challenge to Human Rights”, 
NYU School of Law Research Paper No. 18-05, 2018, pp. 7 and 11. 
3
 LEEK, MOROZOV, “Identity Beyond Othering: Crisis and Politics of Decision in the EU’s Involvement 
in Libya”, International Theory, 2018/10, p. 123. 
4
 On the central role of foreign policy for the production of identity, see LEEK, MOROZOV, cit. supra 
note 3; CAMPBELL, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity, Minneap-
olis, 1992. 
5
 See related LANGFORD, “International Courts and Public Opinion”, 28 February 2018, available at: 
<https://ssrn.com/abstract=3131863>. 
6
 STOYANOVA, “Populism, Exceptionality, and the Right to Family Life of Migrants under the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights”, European Journal of Legal Studies, 2018, pp. 90 and 122-123; 
BAUMGÄRTEL, Demanding Rights: Europe’s Supranational Courts and the Dilemma of Migrant Vulnera-
bility, Cambridge, 2019, pp. 102 and 156. 
7
 On the importance of linguistic practices for the creation of identities in politics, see LEEK, MOROZOV, 
cit. supra note 3, p. 126.  
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with the principle of free movement, a right granted to citizens of the European Un-
ion (‘EU’). The ECtHR’s favourable approach to migration from within is illustrated 
by the use of positively loaded terms such as ‘opportunities’, ‘positive’, ‘globalisa-
tion’, while reverting to negative connotations in discussing migration from beyond 
(‘challenges’).8 Paradoxically, the positive effects of globalism seem to be limited to 
the European context only, and, hence, ‘globalisation’ acquires a distinctively re-
gional rather than universal flair in the case-law of the court.9 
This chapter discusses two strands of arguments: the first strand explores the rule 
of law and whether the courts are influenced more by political guidelines rather than 
the law. The second strand looks at what the European regional courts consider tra-
ditional European values, and whether these values are a judicial creation in response 
to the migration crisis.10 In the context of this discussion, is the ECtHR still worthy 
of its designation as the “lighthouse” for those who seek protection?11 Is the Court 
really the “crown jewel”12 and “flagship”13 of the Council of Europe, as certain of its 
Member States see it? Indeed, the question arises whether the lighthouse does not 
guide individuals into safe haven any longer. Does, rather, the ship increasingly sail 
under the flag of Euronationalism and thus contribute to the polarization of Europe-
ans and migrants, who as ‘others’ do not share the same set of European values? 
 
 
8
 See for instance, European Court of Human Rights, Shindler v. The United Kingdom, Application 
No. 19840/09, Judgment of 7 May 2013, paras. 37-59. 
9
 Research on European legal culture to a certain extent confirms this hypothesis. See GRØDELAND, 
MILLER, European Legal Cultures in Transition, Cambridge, 2015, p. 6. 
10
 On the alleged judicial activism of the ECtHR in the field of migration: LAVRYSEN, “Is the Stras-
bourg Court Though on Migration?”, 5 December 1992, available at: <https://strasbourgobserv-
ers.com/2012/12/05/is-the-strasbourg-court-tough-on-migration/>. 
11
 MIJATOVIĆ, “Continued Reform of the European Human Rights Convention System: Better Balance, 
Improved Protection”, Address by Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, 12 April 2018, 
Document No. CommDH/Speech (2018), p. 3.  
12
 MÄLKSOO, “Introduction Russia, Strasbourg, and the Paradox of a Human Rights Backlash”, in 
MÄLKSOO, BENEDEK (eds.), Russia and the European Court of Human Rights: The Strasbourg Effect, Cam-
bridge, 2017, p. 3. 
13
 As referred to by the Norwegian government, in: <https://www.regjeringen.no/no/tema/utenrik-
ssaker/menneskerettigheter/innsikt/norge/id578539/> (all translations by the author). The Committee of 
Ministers of the Council of Europe reconfirmed its commitment to the ECHR and the ECtHR in the recent 
Copenhagen Declaration, available at: <https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Copenhagen_Declara-
tion_ENG.pdf>.  
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2. – Approaches, Hypotheses and Choice of Method 
This chapter works with the hypothesis that the European regional courts, although 
formally independent from the legislative and executive of the European Council and 
the EU, respectively, are nonetheless influenced by the current political sentiments. 
The point of departure is the assumption that the European courts play a significant, 
yet not well-recognised and severely under-researched role in the construction of a 
European identity. This chapter is apprehensive that the courts, in their case-law, 
clearly position themselves as to the question of migration and the human rights of 
marginalized people not fitting into the understanding of an European ‘us’.14 As such, 
it resonates Marie-Bénédicte Dembour’s concerns that the ECtHR implicitly shares a 
discourse, and arguably also values, that conceive migrants a threatening others.15 
With an ever-increasing caseload, including numerous cases dealing with migra-
tion, the courts assume an important responsibility for a common European response 
to migration. Judgments and decisions do affect and reflect back on the Member 
States, their administration, their citizenry, and the migrants themselves. As such, 
focus should be shifted from analysing the effects of the executive (and to a lesser 
degree the legislative) powers in Europe, to increasing the scrutiny of the judiciary. 
Thus, this chapter has the underlying objective to create a consciousness of the role 
that courts play in the creation of a European identity. Interconnected, this chapter 
also urges an increased attention of legal scholarship to the use of non-binding soft 
law, as contained in policy documents, and its reference in the case-law of the ECtHR 
and the CJEU.16 
This chapter applies traditional legal methodology in analysing treaty law, case-
law and legal doctrine. However, being situated in the borderland between law and 
politics, it will also draw on scholarship from the political sciences and related dis-
ciplines. Same is valid for academic publications on migration, group identities and 
so-called ‘othering’, if considered useful to strengthen the arguments. Beyond schol-
arly writings, this chapter critically examines official reports, documents, and web-
sites of the EU and the European Council. 
 
14
 See for a similar concern, STOYANOVA, cit. supra note 6, pp. 83, 125. 
15
 DEMBOUR, When Humans Become Migrants, Oxford, 2015, p. 504. 
16
 On the growing significance of soft law for the legal treatment of migrants, see CARDWELL, cit. 
supra note 1, pp. 68, 71-72. 
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3. – Checks and Balances 
“The fundamental principles of the separation of powers and judicial independ-
ence are considered central tenets of all liberal democracies, everywhere and in every 
time. And rightly so”, said Marta Cartabia, Vice President of the Italian Constitu-
tional Court, in her speech in occasion of the opening of the ECtHR’s judicial year 
2018.17 In reverting to Montesquieu’s The Spirit of Laws, Cartabia emphasised that 
the separation of powers and judicial independence are basic conditions for the ef-
fective protection of individual rights and liberties, in order to guarantee to each in-
dividual an effective remedy against any breach of rights.18 A traditional nation State 
is structured upon the separation of powers, according to which the executive, legis-
lative and judiciary branches are separated and independent from each other.19 In a 
functioning State, it would accordingly be worrisome if the executive or legislative 
could directly influence the outcome of the judiciary’s decisions. Note that the leg-
islative indirectly influences the judiciary, since it adopts laws that the courts apply. 
As a matter of fact, the laws of a democratic State will always reflect the current 
electorate and political tendencies. For obvious reasons, same is valid for regional or 
international institutions. On the supranational level, in our case the EU, a similar 
system of checks and balances is put into place. Article 2 of the consolidated version 
of the Treaty on European Union (2008) explicitly links the rule of law with the 
notion of human rights: “the principles of liberty, democracy and respect for human 
rights and fundamental freedoms and of the rule of law”.20 It is broadly acknowledged 
that these principles include the idea of a separation of powers.21 Yet, the separation 
of powers is less clear-cut at the EU level than in many of its member States, partic-
ularly with regard to the legislative and executive branches. CJEU Judge and Profes-
sor of Law Allan Rosas points out that legislation is passed by the EU Council, which 
consists of a ministerial representative of each Member State. In many cases, how-
ever, the Council acts jointly with the European Parliament, consisting of elected 
 
17
 CARTABIA, The Authority of the Judiciary Separation of Powers and Judicial Independence: Current 
Challenges, 26 January 2018, p. 1, available at: <https://www.echr.coe.int/Docu-
ments/Speech_20180126_Cartabia_JY_ENG.pdf>.  
18
 Ibid. 
19
 Available at: <https://www.britannica.com/topic/checks-and-balances>.  
20
 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, OJ C 115, 9 May 2008, p. 13 ff.  
21
 ROSAS, “Separation of Powers in the European Union”, The International Lawyer, 2007, p. 1034. 
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representatives.22 This process of so-called ‘codecision’, where the Council acts to-
gether with the Parliament, is used for areas of exclusive competence of the EU, or 
shared competence with the Member States.23 Thus, the responsibilities of the exec-
utive and the legislative are blurred, with a risk of jeopardising the rule of law. It is 
this structural configuration of the EU that demands increased attention, as it reflects 
in the jurisprudence of the European courts. In her above mentioned speech, Cartabia 
requests the preservation of the main dividing line between political institutions and 
institutions of protection. In her view, the judicial independence is put at risk when 
the clear duality between government and the judicial branch is distorted. Although, 
in her speech, Cartabia probably did not have the ECtHR and the European political 
institutions in mind, her call for preservation is equally valid for them. Thus, not only 
the executive and the legislative, but also the executive and the judicial branch are 
not as clearly separated as one would expect. Importantly, Cartabia points out that 
judge-made law is an important factor that can unhinge checks and balances, since 
judges act as law-makers rather than law-appliers.24 If the parliamentary legislation 
is of poor quality, the interpretative power of judges expands “hugely, in the form of 
value-oriented interpretation”,25 a matter of particular significance to the present dis-
cussion on the interpretation of ostensible European values. Given that the ECHR is 
a living instrument, which is subject to dynamic interpretation, such law-making is 
acceptable within certain limits. Considering that human rights law aims at protect-
ing individuals from excessive State power, an expansion of the individuals’ rights 
by means of a dynamic interpretation generally seems justified. While the Court has 
to decide on how to interpret imprecise provisions or adopt the laws’ application to 
new, unforeseen circumstances, it may nonetheless not trespass the boundaries of 
what the law is meant to regulate. Erik Voeten points out that the inherent subjectiv-
ity of judicial discretion of a rights review is understood as a political defeat: the 
Russian president Vladimir Putin, for example, claimed that the Ilaşcu decision by 
the ECtHR was a “purely political decision, an undermining of trust in the judicial 
international system”.26 It could be argued that the ECtHR’s dynamic interpretation 
 
22
 Ibid.  
23
 Available at: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/council-eu/decision-making/>.  
24
 CARTABIA, cit. supra note 17, p. 2. 
25
 Ibid.  
26 VOETEN, “Politics, Judicial Behaviour, and Institutional Design”, in CHRISTOFFERSEN, MADSEN 
(eds.), The European Court of Human Rights between Law and Politics, Oxford, 2011, pp. 61-62. See 
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is a Pandora’s box that creates more problems than it solves. Disregarding, for the 
sake of the argument, the already controversial relationship between the ECtHR and 
Russia,27 judicial interpretations that are considered subjective judge-made law could 
be seen as counterproductive to the whole human rights system. Since the concerned 
States, for whatever (legal, political or moral) reason, do not recognise the judgment 
as impartial, they are unwilling to acknowledge the decision, thereby leading to a 
backlash for human rights of the affected individuals.28 Oddly, both side make the 
argument of politicization: the Court holds that the respondent State disregards its 
decisions for political reasons (e.g. in order to continue with human rights viola-
tions), while the State claims the Court is interfering with its politics (e.g. by not 
respecting the margin of appreciation) by politicizing the law.29 The non-compli-
ance30 of States with judgments rendered by the ECtHR in cases of migration is ar-
guably also tainted with politics. The stronger the pushback against the migrant ‘oth-
ers’ in the domestic political sphere, the more unlikely the respondent State is willing 
to respect and comply with supranational decisions that determine a violation of the 
migrants’ freedoms and rights, especially if these decisions entail a liberal, inclusive, 
and non-nationalist interpretation of the law. 
Matej Avbelj convincingly argues that the CJEU, prior to the adoption of the 
Treaty of Maastricht, in a similar manner developed and introduced an unwritten, 
hence judge-made, standard of human rights protection for the EU and its institu-
tions. In what he terms a human rights “inflation”, Avbelj shows that the EU in the 
case of Wachauf v. Germany expanded this standard beyond the institution itself to 
 
European Court of Human Rights. Ilaşcu and others v. Moldova and Russia, Application No. 48787/99, 
Judgment of 8 July 2004. 
27
 For an analysis of the relationship, see: MÄLKSOO, “The European Court of Human Rights and 
Russia: Quo Vadis?”, 22 November 2018, available at: <http://www.cambridgeblog.org/2018/11/the-eu-
ropean-court-of-human-rights-and-russia-quo-vadis/>. 
28
 MÄLKSOO, cit. supra note 12, pp. 3-25, concluding that realism has to prevail in dealing with States 
with anti-liberal history and ideology. Mälksoo considers the weakness of theories of human rights social-
ization that they tend to suggest universal models without duly taking into account the specific country 
contexts. 
29
 For the case of Russia, see, GRIFFIN, Russia could withdraw from European Convention on Human 
Rights, state news agency RIA reports, 2018, available at: <https://www.independ-
ent.co.uk/news/world/europe/russia-echr-human-rights-european-convention-putin-kremlin-eu-
a8234086.html>. 
30
 On the non-compliance, see the report of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, DE 
VRIES, Implementation of Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, Doc. 13864 09, September 
2015, available at: <http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-DocDetails-EN.asp?fileid=22005>. 
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become a binding norm for all its member States in their implementation of EU law.31 
Although the intent assumingly was good, it nonetheless led to an adverse reaction: 
the EU Member States and particularly their constitutional courts considered this 
judge-made law an illegitimate interference, a threat to their sovereignty, and a 
breach of the principle of legality that prescribes the foreseeability of the law.32 
The following sections will further discuss whether the separation of powers is 
in jeopardy and whether the judges of the European Courts have created a concept 
of shared ‘European values’ and a common ‘European identity’, innate to ‘us, the 
Europeans’, but lacking to the ‘others, the migrants’. 
4. – Fundamental Rights and Freedoms in the Case-law of the European 
Courts 
Not only the boundaries of the branches of the EU and the Council of Europe 
tend to be blurred, also the interface between community and human rights law, 
which is highly relevant for the discussions of the different European organs’ com-
petence, has become more unclear. Initially, the two areas of law were not con-
founded. However, already in 1969, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) declared 
that fundamental rights, although at the time not explicitly codified, formed part of 
the general principles of community law, the observance of which the Court en-
sured.33 Two decades later, the ECJ decided that the Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) had “particular significance”,34 
and finally in the 1990s, the ECJ started to cite individual judgments of the ECtHR 
to back up its interpretations.35 The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU was 
proclaimed in 2000 and became legally binding in 2009 with the entry into force of 
the Treaty of Lisbon. In its chapeau, the Charter 
 
31
 AVBELJ, ‘Human rights inflation in the European Union’, in VIOLINI, BARAGGIA (eds.), The Frag-
mented Landscape of Fundamental Rights Protection in Europe: The Role of Judicial and Non-Judicial 
Actors, Cheltenham, 2018, pp. 10-11. 
32
 Ibid. 
33
 Case 29/69, Erich Stauder v. City of Ulm - Sozialamt, 12 November 1969, ECLI:EU:C:1969:57, 
para. 7. 
34
 Joined Cases 46/87 and 227/88, Hoechst v. Commission of the European Communities, 21 Septem-
ber 1989, ECLI:EU:C:1989:337, para. 13. 
35
 Case C-13/94, P v. S & Cornwall County Council, 30 April 1996, ECLI:EU:C:1996:170, para. 16. 
See extensive discussion in: ROSAS, cit. supra note 21, p. 1041; AVBELJ, cit. supra note 31, pp. 12-13. 
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“reaffirms, with due regard for the powers and tasks of the Union (…), the rights as they 
result (…) from the constitutional traditions and international obligations common to the 
Member States, the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms, (…) and the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union and 
of the European Court of Human Rights.” 
Interestingly, the Charter connects the notions of powers, constitutional traditions 
with international obligations arising from the ECHR, and the case-law of the CJEU 
and ECtHR. With the adoption of the Charter, the EU has clearly, on a political and 
on a legal level, confirmed its commitment to human rights and the corresponding 
jurisprudence of the European regional courts. In Article 52(3), the Charter guaran-
tees the rights corresponding to the ones contained in the ECHR.36 In doing so, it 
prevents different standards of human rights in the national implementation of EU 
law.37 Moreover, the increasing referral of the ECtHR to the CJEU’s case-law further 
streamlines the human rights standard in Europe.38 Indeed, the human rights approach 
of both European courts appears to be largely, if not fully, coherent. At first glance, 
it seems as though this consistency of the human rights approaches is beneficially 
for the individuals concerned, in being accorded the same rights by the different ju-
dicial institutions of the European community. Nonetheless, a different scenario 
might be conceivable: what if this coherence is detrimental to migrants? There are 
indications that the case-law coming out of both courts would take a coordinated 
approach. If the ECtHR increasingly discusses migrants as the unwanted ‘others’, 
this jurisprudence would reflect in the case-law of the CJEU, thus amplifying their 
negative perception. In turn, if the hypothesis is correct that courts’ decisions can 
influence the public opinion and thereby also policy makers, then the migrants’ sit-
uation is further deteriorated. 
 
36
 Charter of Fundamental Rights, OJ C 364, 18 December 2000 p. 1. The official commentary to Art. 
52(3) holds that the scope of the guaranteed rights is determined by the law itself as well as the case-law 
of the ECtHR and the CJEU (OJ C 303, 14 December 2007, p. 33). 
37
 LOCK, “The ECJ and the ECtHR: The Future Relationship between the Two European Courts”, The 
Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals, 2009, p. 283; BOELES et al., cit. supra note 1, p. 
45, pointing out that the ECHR is not legally binding within the ambit of EU law and that the EU is not 
party to the ECHR. 
38
 E.g. see European Court of Human Rights, Maslov v. Austria, Application No. 1638/03, Judgment 
of 23 June 2008, para. 42; Id., Pellegrin v. France, Application No. 28541/95, Judgment (Grand Chamber) 
of 8 December 1999, para. 66; Id., Goodwin v. United Kingdom Application No. 28957/95, Judgment 
(Grand Chamber) of 11 June 2002, para. 43. Furthermore: LOCK, cit. supra note 37, p. 380. 
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In addition to its intra-European efforts, including the consistency of the human 
rights jurisprudence of the regional courts, the EU is committed to cross-regional 
work on positive human rights narratives.39 This commitment is in line with the hu-
man rights priorities of the United Nations (‘UN’) and the Sustainable Development 
Goals (‘SDG’) that the world leaders agreed upon in 2015. The SDG No. 10 has the 
aim of reducing inequalities and calls upon all States to “[f]acilitate orderly, safe, 
regular and responsible migration and mobility of people, including through the im-
plementation of planned and well-managed migration policies”.40 The UN 2030 
Agenda for Sustainable Development, by which the SDG officially came into force, 
furthermore recognises the positive contribution of migrants and calls for full respect 
for their human rights and humane treatment, irrespective of their migration status.41 
Thus, the EU is not only bound by positive law to protecting human rights as con-
tained in the TFEU and the ECHR, it is also devoted to observing the human rights 
regime of the UN. This commitment of a supranational organisation is praiseworthy 
and probably uncontroversial, given that its Member States without exception are 
members to the core UN human rights treaties and, as such, legally bound to fulfilling 
their provisions. This commitment across treaty regimes is undoubtedly part of a 
trend, in which international and/or supranational organisations pledge to adhere to 
international (human rights) treaties to which they formally cannot accede because 
they lack statehood.42 Although the conflation of treaty regimes entails a harmonisa-
tion of the law, it at the same time also causes interpretational headaches for the law-
applying bodies. The ECtHR, for instance, will be forced to interpret legal sources 
that it does not formally have jurisdiction over. The Court will also have to refer to 
case-law that originates in cases that do not deal with human rights violations. 
In returning to the UN approach to migration, the UN Secretary General in a 
report of 2017 on ‘Making Migration Work for All’ emphasizes its links to the 2030 
 
39
 General Secretariat of the Council of the EU, Conclusions on EU Priorities in UN Human Rights 
Fora, Doc. 6346/18 of 26 February 2018.  
40
 See goal target No. 10.7. Available at: <https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/inequality/>. 
41
 General Assembly of the United Nations, “Transforming Our World: the 2030 Agenda for Sustain-
able Development”, UN Doc. A/RES/70/1 of 21 October 2015, para. 29. 
42
 A similar development occurred in the field of international criminal law: the International Criminal 
Court (ICC) and Art. 21(3) Rome Statute commit to respecting human rights law, a treaty regime with a 
very distinct aim and nature than international criminal law. The ICC, as an international organisation, 
cannot become member to any human rights treaties that are tailored to prevent the misuse of State power 
over individuals. 
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Agenda for Sustainable Development. He acknowledges a shared responsibility of 
States to address the needs and concerns over migration and to protect the human 
rights of migrants.43 Although highlighting the positive aspects of migration as “an 
engine of economic growth, innovation and sustainable development” that assists to 
create bonds between countries and societies, the Secretary General also stresses that 
migration is a “source of division within and between States and societies” and, as 
such, “one of the most urgent and profound tests of international cooperation”.44 He 
hoped that the Global Compact on Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, adopted in 
the following year, would bring the challenges of migration between Member States 
under control and bridge the divide between their policy implementations and ambi-
tions. Moreover, he sadly acknowledged that “xenophobic political narratives about 
migration are all too widespread”, a fact that remains valid today too.45 In December 
2018 then, the UN General Assembly by resolution adopted the Global Compact.46 
The resolution acknowledges the existence of “misleading narratives that generate 
negative perceptions of migrants”, a development that must be countered by provid-
ing research and access to objective, evidence-based, and clear information on mi-
gration.47 The intrinsic connection between the perception of the migrant ‘others’, 
who are different than ‘we’, and xenophobic, misleading narratives – to borrow the 
wording of the UN documents – cannot be underestimated. In this connection, re-
searchers have pointed out that the understanding of a European identity based on 
common values could be lopsided if it is mobilized against European integration, 
claiming that the ‘others’ lack our shared memories, traditions, and myths.48 This 
dangerous development of othering that has been explored in the social sciences, 
foremost social psychology and sociology, has to be taken on board by legal and 
political sciences too. Note that the importance of research is highlighted throughout 
the Global Compact, a call that we in academia cannot be left unanswered.49 
 
43
 Report of the UN Secretary-General, “Making Migration Work for All”, UN Doc. A/72/643 of 12 
December 2017, para. 5. 
44
 Ibid., para. 1. 
45
 Ibid., para. 9. 
46
 General Assembly of the United Nations, UN Doc. A/RES/73/195 of 19 December 2018 (based 
upon General Assembly Resolution A/RES/72/244 of 24 December 2017). 
47
 General Assembly of the United Nations, UN Doc. A/RES/73/195, cit. supra note 46, para. 10. 
48
 CICEO, “The Difficult Path Towards Europeanness: Assessing the Politics of Culture and Identity in 
the European Union”, On-line Journal Modelling the New Europe, 2016, p. 10. 
49
 Cit. supra note 46, paras. 17, 17(f) and (k), 21(j), 35(c), and 66.  
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5. – Immigration, Borders, and Human Rights 
Borders represent the belonging and the exclusion, the interiority and the exteri-
ority.50 The functions and usefulness of borders in the civic space is, according to 
Étienne Balibar, becoming more problematic because they allow for the crystallisa-
tion of collective identities: the ‘us’, the ‘Europeans’, the ‘majority’. Simultaneously, 
these borders fill functions of imaginary protection, in separating ‘us’ from ‘them’.51 
Yet, in the state-centred sphere of international and European law, States are free to 
exercise border controls due to their sovereignty.52 In recent years, the border controls 
at the external border of the EU have been increased and led to tighter removal pro-
cedures for nationals of non-EU Member States.53 However, the jurisdiction over 
immigration and decisions of whom to allow access to the national territory does not 
free a State from its liability for any human rights violations occurring during the 
performance of these tasks.54 Thus, the recognition of a State’s jurisdiction at its bor-
ders runs parallel to its obligations under and the applicability of human rights trea-
ties, which include “affirmative measures to guarantee that individuals subject to 
their jurisdiction can exercise and enjoy [their] rights”.55 In other words, its sovereign 
right of border controls by no means impedes the respective State’s human rights 
obligations and can, as such, not be promoted as an argument to curtail these rights. 
This understanding also resonates in the judgment on the case of Khlaifia and Others 
v. Italy, which deals with the internment of Northern African refugees on the Italian 
island of Lampedusa in 2011. The Grand Chamber of the ECtHR made clear that it 
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 BALIBAR, We, the People of Europe? Reflections on Transnational Citizenship, Princeton, 2004, p. 
5; KESBY, The Right to Have Rights: Citizenship, Humanity, and International Law, Oxford, 2010, p. 103. 
51
 Ibid., p. 110. Similarly, DEMBOUR, KELLY, “Introduction”, in DEMBOUR, KELLY (eds.), Are Human 
Rights for Migrants? Critical Reflections on the Status of Irregular Migrants in Europe and the United 
States, Abingdon, 2011, p. 5. 
52
 See e.g. discussion in European Court of Human Rights, Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. the 
United Kingdom, Judgment of 28 May 1985, para. 67. 
53
 GRANT, “Irregular Migration and Frontier Deaths: Acknowledging a Right to Identity”, in 
DEMBOUR, KELLY (eds.), cit. supra note 51, p. 59. 
54
 OCHR, Recommended Principles and Guidelines on Human Rights at International Borders, avail-
able at: <https://www.ohchr.org/en/issues/migration/pages/internationalborders.aspx>, pt. 22 (discussed in 
European Court of Human Rights, M.A. and others v. Lithuania, Application no. 59793/17, Judgment of 
11 December 2018, Concurring Opinion of Judge Pinto de Albuquerque, para. 19). 
55
 Report on the Human Rights Situation of Refugees and Migrant Families and Unaccompanied Chil-
dren in the United States of America, p. 30, para. 42 (discussed in European Court of Human Rights, M.A. 
and others v. Lithuania, cit. supra note 54, Concurring Opinion of Judge Pinto de Albuquerque, para. 19). 
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“an increasing influx of migrants cannot absolve a State of its obligations”.56 Alt-
hough this specific case dealt with the prohibition of torture, the same logic will 
apply to any other freedom and right of migrants within the jurisdiction of the High 
Contracting parties to the ECHR (see Article 1 ECHR). The Court moreover pointed 
out that the “objective difficulties related to a migrant crisis” cannot function as a 
legitimate excuse of the violation of human rights.57 The Court thereby acknowledges 
both the European States’ struggles in dealing with the sudden influx of migrants and 
the migrants’ human rights that need to be respected, especially given their vulnera-
ble situation. The ECtHR’s sister court, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 
explicitly recognized that “immigrants are ‘the most vulnerable to potential or actual 
violations of their human rights’”.58 Henceforth, the interpretation of their human 
rights and freedoms has to take into consideration their vulnerability and heightened 
need for protection.  
Despite the fact that irregular arrivals to Europe have been brought down to so-
called ‘pre-crisis levels’, a notable reduction of 90% since the height of the migration 
crisis in 2015,59 certain Member States of the European Council still consider migra-
tion as the biggest threat to Europe.60 Equally, in the view of Europeans, immigration 
remains the main concern facing the EU, and is mentioned twice as often as terror-
ism.61 Arguably, as long as migration is perceived as a threat, the governments of the 
respective Member States will not approve of a liberal jurisprudence of the European 
courts regarding the rights of migrants and immigrant minorities. The adverse polit-
ical climate regarding migrants and the interrelated mounting pressure on the ECtHR 
on the part of certain European governments is even explicitly noted by Judge Pinto 
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 European Court of Human Rights, Khlaifia and Others v. Italy, Application No. 16483/12, Judgment 
(Grand Chamber) of 15 December 2016, para. 184.  
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 Ibid. 
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 Inter-American Court of Human Rights, case of Vélez Loor v. Panama, Judgment of 23 November 
2010, para. 98. 
59
 <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/european-council/2018/12/13-14/>. On the reduc-
tion see:< https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/migratory-pressures/>.  
60
 See, “Migration Biggest Threat to Europe, Says Defence Minister”, available at: <https://hungary-
today.hu/migration-biggest-threat-to-europe-says-defence-minister/>. 
61
 European Commission, Standard Eurobarometer 90: Public opinion in the European Union, Report 
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de Albuquerque in a very recent judgment.62 This trend is yet another worrisome 
challenge to the rule of law in Europe and correlates with research on the progressive 
interpretation of human rights law on the national level: in the post-war era, Euro-
pean domestic courts expanded the rights of minorities and migrants, foremost by 
transplanting national rights with universal human rights.63 Yet, it appears that the 
more the courts expanded the rights of the migrants, the stronger the pushback was 
against an acceptance of these ‘others’ in society. Current developments on the Eu-
ropean regional level suggest that the European courts curb the attribution of rights 
and, thus, adjust to expectations and perceptions of their constituency.64 Most re-
markably, this ostensible development, whereby the European governments adjust 
to their constituency’s fear of the migrant ‘other’ and increase pressure on the EC-
tHR, cannot be reproduced statistically: the general attitudes of Europeans toward 
immigration did not become more negative during the years of the “refugee cri-
sis”, quite contrary to what most media and right-wing politicians suggest.65 
Migration is not a new phenomenon in Europe. Minority immigrant communities 
have often been successfully integrated, and new national identities have developed 
over time.66 In more recent years, however, migration has been associated with inter-
group conflicts and violence, with incompatible national identities, with the rise of 
populism, xenophobia, and nationalism.67 “[A]t some point in our lives or another, 
we are all minorities”, remarked Stavros Lambrinidis, the EU Special Representative 
for Human Rights at the United Nations Human Rights Council in February 2018. 
“If, when in the majority”, he stressed, “we are tolerant when ‘minorities’ we may 
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 European Court of Human Rights, M.A. and others v. Lithuania, cit. supra note 54, Concurring 
Opinion of Judge Pinto de Albuquerque, para. 16. See an extended discussion of his concurring opinion 
below. 
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Court of Human Rights”, Wisconsin International Law Journal, 2018, pp. 20 and 23. 
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 Ibid., p. 22. See also: DEMBOUR, cit. supra note 15, pp. 117-119. 
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 CAUGHEY, O’GRADY, WARSHAW, “Policy Ideology in European Mass Publics, 1981-2016”, Amer-
ican Political Science Review, 2019; KUSTOV, LAAKER, RELLER, “The Stability of Immigration Attitudes: 
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BAUMGÄRTEL, cit. supra note 6, p. 4; FØLLESDAL, “Third Country Nationals as European Citizens: The 
Case Defended”, in SMITH, WRIGHT (eds.), Whose Europe? The Turn towards Democracy, Oxford, 1999, 
p. 105. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judicial Responses to the Migration Crisis … 15 
 
 
not ‘like’, or that may not be ‘like us’, are repressed, then beware: We are opening 
the floodgates to our own future repression and discrimination as well”.68 The UN 
Secretary-General, António Guterres, equally stressed the importance of reversing 
those trends and of recommitting to the protection of the rights of all migrants.69 
The concurring opinion of the ECHR Judge Pinto de Albuquerque in the recent 
M.A. and others v. Lithuania case resonates the same chorus. In unusually strong 
language, the judge compares the treatment of migrants who have been rejected at 
land borders and who are returned without an individual assessment of their claims 
with the treatment of animals: “Migrants are not cattle that can be driven away like 
this”.70 The judge might be talking figuratively, but the image of the unwanted ‘oth-
ers’ who are treated not like humans, but like beasts, is haunting. It reverberates re-
search from social sciences on othering, especially of cases of dehumanisation, 
where the ‘others’ are perceived as lacking a human essence. They are seen as infe-
rior, unworthy of dignified treatment, and of a lesser value.71 If the ‘others’ — the 
migrants in our case — are understood as animals, ‘we’ will never be able to accept 
them as equals, as humans with the same inherent rights. The full recognition of the 
‘other’ migrants as humans with inalienable human rights is crucial for their approval 
and integration in ‘our’ society. Interrelated, the acceptance of the rights of ‘others’ 
is considered one of eight key domains that comprise positive peace.72 Hence, the 
recognition and enforcement of the human rights of migrant ‘others’ appears to have 
a positive effect on peace. 
Judge Pinto de Albuquerque is clear in his opinion that the ECtHR must ensure 
the effective protection of migrants. Furthermore, he holds that land borders are not 
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 EU Special Representative for Human Rights, High-level segment by Stavros Lambrinidis at the 
United Nations Human Rights Council, 27 February 2018, available at: <https://eeas.europa.eu/delega-
tions/un-geneva/40477/hrc-37-high-level-segment-statement-he-mr-stavros-lambrinidis-eu-special-repre-
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 Report of the UN Secretary-General, “Making Migration Work for All”, cit. supra note 43, paras. 
1, 4(b), 5 and 39. 
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zones of exclusion or exception from States’ human-rights obligations. What is re-
markable in this case, is the continued and strong emphasis of the judge that the 
ECtHR must remain the “conscience of Europe”, especially considering that he con-
curs with the majority’s judgment.73 It could, indeed, be argued that there is no need 
to further dwell on what the majority already has decided, especially since Pinto de 
Albuquerque agrees with their conclusion. However, his concern with the respect of 
the migrants’ rights and the Court’s corresponding jurisprudence could be explained 
by an undeniable trend of increased nationalism, which is fuelled by populist views 
and results in attitudes of fear and hate.74 Judge Pinto de Albuquerque clearly goes 
beyond a restrained, objective legal analysis, when he takes a passionate stance on 
current developments and urges the Court not to surrender to destructive political 
developments. His fervent appeal merits a quote in full length: 
“In the wake of a new and dangerous ‘post-international law’ world, this opinion is a 
plea for building bridges, not walls, for the bridges required by those in need of international 
protection, not walls arising from the fear that has been percolating in recent years through 
global sewers of hatred. Although justified as an attempt to curb illegal immigration, human 
trafficking or smuggling, these physical barriers reflect an ill-minded isolationist policy and 
represent, as a matter of fact, the prevailing malign political Weltanschauung in some corners 
of the world, which perceives migrants as a cultural and social threat that must be countered 
by whatever means necessary and views all asylum claims as baseless fantasies on the part 
of people conniving to bring chaos to the Western world. The culture of fear, with its deliri-
ous ruminations against ‘cosmopolitan elites’ and ‘foreign’ multiculturalism, and its most 
noxious rhetoric in favour of ‘our way of life’ and ‘identity politics’, has burst into the main-
stream.”75 
Pinto de Albuquerque probably oversteps the tasks assigned to him as a judge of 
the ECtHR on the bench of the M.A. and others v. Lithuania case, namely the inter-
pretation and application of the ECHR (see Article 32(1) ECHR). Although his plea 
could arguably be considered a breach of his duties, the judge demonstrates a very 
“high moral character”, as required by Article 21(1) ECHR. He points to several 
noteworthy developments that have been topic of research in numerous disciplines, 
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albeit not so much from law: hatred, threat, and fear of the ‘others’ that stand in 
opposition to ‘our’ identity. These are issues worth highlighting because of their po-
tential to negatively affect our society, a democratic order and the respect of human 
rights. The perceived threat of the ‘others’ is also one of the characteristics of violent 
clashes, among other before the outburst of genocides.76 The analysis of this chapter, 
by no means, has an intention to imply the imminent danger of a genocide. However, 
it concurs with the worries of Judge Pinto de Albuquerque on how issues of identity 
politics permeate the Weltanschauung of a growing number of individuals in Europe, 
and elsewhere.77 The pledge equally reveals a fear of a weakening ECtHR, a court 
that surrenders to developments of the political mainstream, a court whose jurispru-
dence reflects ‘our’ view of the ‘others’ that are not welcome to Europe. Of a court 
that becomes a part in the political game rather than remaining an independent pillar 
and the guardian of everyone’s human rights within the territories of the member 
States of the Council of Europe.  
6. – Migration, Human Rights, and Values 
The promotion and protection of human rights is at the heart of multilateralism, 
a central pillar of the UN system, and a core and founding value of the EU itself.78 
The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU or ‘Treaty of Lisbon’) 
vows to draw inspiration from the cultural, religious and humanist inheritance of 
Europe, from which the universal values of the inviolable and inalienable rights of 
the human person, freedom, democracy, equality and the rule of law have devel-
oped.79 Yet, do these ‘inalienable rights’ today apply to European citizens only and 
are the ‘universal values’ in fact regional values? This section will briefly explore 
the value system that underlies the European human rights regime and how it is in-
terpreted in the case-law of the courts. 
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The Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy of 
2016 (EU Global Strategy), a non-binding policy document, reconfirms the EU’s 
commitment to human rights as embossed in the Charter of Fundamental Rights.80 
Albeit its vow to human rights, the EU Global Strategy, unlike earlier strategic doc-
uments, treats migration as a challenge and reveals the internal crisis that the EU is 
facing due to migration inflows. Research has shown that the Global Strategy pro-
vides different narratives of migration, for instance in connection with purported val-
ues.81 The Global Strategy even explicitly emphasises that “remaining true to our 
values is a matter of law as much as of ethics and identity”.82 Importantly, such value 
narratives are indicators of the community’s understanding of social relations and 
factors legitimising political decisions.83 Thus, the value system of strategic docu-
ments can influence the European polity, and, arguably, also its judiciary. The Global 
Strategy is so recent that it has not found its way into the case-law of the ECtHR or 
the CJEU. But it is not unlikely that either court, in the near future, will refer to the 
Global Strategy in a case that concerns migrants. By way of comparison, take, for 
instance, the ECtHR judgment in the case of Shindler v. UK. It scrutinises on more 
than five pages (of a total length of 39 pages) resolutions and recommendations of 
the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe regarding migration issues. In 
addition, on  two more  pages, the judgment discusses the take of the Committee of 
Ministers on migration, globalisation, and development. Although the Parliamentary 
Assembly terms itself a “hotbed of ideas” and a “factory of radical ideas”,84 its rec-
ommendations can hardly be considered of a legal nature and, as such, not a source 
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of law for the ECtHR. The reference of the Court to political documents is problem-
atic. Not only does it interfere with the check and balances, as discussed above in 
section 3, the narratives of migration contained in such documents will in all proba-
bility be reflected in the case-law of the courts.85 
7. – Constructing a European Identity: ‘Otherness’ in the Case-law of 
the ECtHR 
Any law contains certain values and interests.86 Courts, in turn, interpret the re-
spective legislation by reference to the preparatory work in order to determine these 
underlying values. Yet, should courts even be legitimised to make value judgments, 
beyond the obvious intent of the drafters as manifested in the drafting history? The 
question arises whether the courts, in their legal reasoning, revert to values beyond 
the ones expressly stated by the drafters, such as inherent ‘European values’ that 
imply a difference between ‘us’ (Europeans) and ‘them’ (the others from beyond our 
borders).87There is also a possibility that the judges refer to ‘European values’ as the 
implicit values contained in the ECHR, values upon which the European human 
rights system was erected. From an interpretative point of view, such teleological 
approach is hardly debatable. However, a seemingly unresolvable issue arises: a ref-
erence to values that guided the drafting of the ECHR in 1950 might stand in contrast 
to a dynamic interpretation of today. At the same time, it should not be ruled out that 
a dynamic interpretation could reflect current anti-migratory sentiments, which, in 
return, stand in contrast to the original telos of the ECHR. 
The reasoning of the courts is, at times, based on moral rather than legal norms. 
While high morals are part and parcel of an international judge’s desirable charac-
teristics,88 there are (at least) two downsides to reverting to ethical arguments in a 
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judgment: first, moral standards are exposed to changing values and, second, due to 
the principle of legality the judges cannot build their legal arguments on moral stand-
ards that are not embossed in binding law. Two dissenting opinions to two judgments 
of the ECtHR exemplify these issues. They do, notably, not deal with issues of mi-
gration. Yet, since migration is an area that is bound to evoke issues of values, 
(in)justice, and ethics, similar challenges could arise. In his dissenting opinion in the 
case of Ždanoka v. Latvia, Judge Zupančič ferociously holds that the ECtHR “must 
take an unambiguous and unshakable moral stand on [aggression deriving from re-
gressive nationalism]”.89 In the view of the judge, inter-ethnic tolerance is a categor-
ical imperative of modernity and from intolerance too many violations of human 
rights derive.90 While his argument is important and laudable, he nonetheless does 
not base it on law, but rather on ethics, hence making it more susceptible to attacks. 
The second judgment is in the case of Vasiliauskas v. Lithuania. The minority judges 
Villiger, Power-Forde, Pinto de Albuquerque and Kūris cautioned against a too for-
malistic line of reasoning in the fight against impunity, because of the ECtHR’s role 
as “the conscience of Europe”.91 Yet, if judges do not apply the law formalistically, 
but rather based on conscience or ethics, their decisions become void of legitimacy. 
A weakening of the legitimacy risks entailing a lack of adherence to the law given 
that its application and interpretation is not foreseeable and not governed objectively 
or formalistically. Such unpredictability is not advisable. Because while in both cases 
above, the judges had the best of intentions in guarding the interest of the weaker or 
suppressed party, the pendulum might swing the other way and be detrimental, for 
example to migrant, who claim a breach of human rights before a court. 
Indeed, research indicates that the ECtHR in recent times has shown increased 
willingness to depart from its standard jurisprudence in order to accommodate the 
shifts in attitude of its fractured national audience.92 Whether this adjustment occurs 
as a response to the backlash against the Court or is an expression of a new realist 
jurisprudential attitude has yet to be determined.93 The nature of the ECHR as a living 
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instrument arguably enables an adaptation of the ECtHR’s jurisprudence to any pre-
sent-day conditions.94 Yet, if a change of values occurs at the level of the national 
constituencies, which in turn is mirrored in the respective elected governments, will 
the courts adjust their interpretation of the law accordingly, in order to accommodate 
‘modern’ ideas? What if these contemporary ideas contradict the original high stand-
ards of the protection of human rights and fundamental liberties – and as such are 
detrimental to the rights of migrants? According to recent scholarship there is indeed 
a risk of a politicization of the ECtHR.95 Moreover, as indicated above, the intrinsic 
value narrative of many a political document will be reflected in the case-law of the 
Court by way of reference. Thus, the value question will become part of the legal 
interpretation of human rights law.96 With regard to migration, scholars have pointed 
to the incoherence and disharmony between a value-led polity and the respect of 
national, European, and international law that is central to the EU’s values; they 
identify a recent tendency of increasing restrictive legislation that “seem to pay lip 
service to largely shared fundamentals of international law (…), while instead serv-
ing the EU’s interests.97 Conversely, as discussed above in Section 4, if the EU and 
the Council of Europe streamline their (human rights) jurisprudence and pledge to 
respect the UN human rights regime, then international law is harmonised and, 
largely, builds on the same values. The question remains how susceptible these con-
structions are to a change in values. 
8. – Migration, Expatriation, Globalisation 
The jurisprudence of the ECtHR reveals a paradox: some judgments, in discuss-
ing expatriation and migration, emphasize their positive aspects on globalisation. 
Yet, these positive sides are seemingly limited to pan-European movements of indi-
viduals only. For instance, in the case of Shindler vs. The United Kingdom, the EC-
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tHR holds that “expatriation could be a positive effect of globalisation that contrib-
uted to building diverse, tolerant and multicultural societies”.98 Is the globalism that 
the Court refers to limited to Europe only and, in the interpretation of the Court, is 
globalism a regional development rather than a global one? Expatriation within Eu-
rope is associated with a dynamic, modern, positive, and economic development, 
while expatriation from beyond Europe’s borders is perceived as a threat. It might 
seem as though migration, expatriation, and globalisation are considered positive if 
related to citizens of the EU Member States. The migration of EU citizens is, notably, 
protected under the rights of free movement (Article 45 TFEU). Yet, the court does 
not stop with the acknowledgment of this fundamental right. Rather, the Court ap-
plies a string of positively loaded words like ‘opportunities’, ‘multi-culturalism’, 
‘tolerant’ in its discussion of the movement of individuals within the legal boundaries 
of Europe.99 Several scholars, however, raise concerns of the not only positive effects 
of globalisation. Arjun Appadurai, for instance, stresses that globalisation exacer-
bates uncertainties where the lines between ‘us’ and ‘them’ have been blurred. He 
points to a development of two Europes: the inclusive and multicultural one, and the 
anxious xenophobic other one, in which minorities activate worries about belong-
ing.100 In his dissenting opinion in the above-mentioned case of Ždanoka v. Latvia, 
Judge Zupančič choses to accentuate the negative effects of globalisation. In refer-
ence to the Harvard legal scholar, Roberto Mangabeira Unger, the judge asserts that 
the current developments of preserving national identity (or nationalism) are a reac-
tion to globalisation. Zupančič equally discerns a parallel trend of more aggressive 
attitudes towards minorities in a society, such as the Roma in Bulgaria (Nachova and 
Others v. Bulgaria), the Serbians in Croatia (Blečić v. Croatia), and immigrant work-
ers in Germany and France. He concludes that in “many of these realms, we detect 
the unhealthy trend from [sic] patriotism on the one hand, to nationalism, chauvinism 
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and racism on the other”.101 Thus, although migration within the borders of Europe 
is associated with (economic) prosperity and a paradoxical construct of ‘regional 
globalism’, the downside of peoples’ movements, particularly if they are perceived 
as members of a minority group of ‘other’ Europeans, is incontestable. 
9. – Conclusion 
“If nationality is the mirror image of citizenship which defines the individual in 
international law (...), to what extent can citizenship of the [European] Union be con-
sidered to have such an identity?”, asks Elspeth Guild.102 Traditionally, citizenship 
has been attached to the belonging to a nation State, defined by its stable territory, 
sovereignty, and population.103 This belonging entailed a number of rights and duties 
of the individuals and formed their collective national identity.104 At the same time, 
this national citizenship – by a territorially bound population – also defined who was 
excluded therefrom. The borders that delimit a national as well as a regional belong-
ing, inevitably contain a system of exclusion.105 This chapter examined several as-
pects of (non-) belonging to Europe, the identity of Europe, and the creation of Eu-
ropeanness within the jurisprudence of the European regional courts. In particular, 
this chapter worked with a hypothesis that the European regional courts are influ-
enced by the current political sentiments and, as such, reflect value judgments against 
migrants in their judgments. The case-law coming out of the European regional 
courts does, so far, not openly discuss migrants as the ‘others’. It also refrains from 
deliberating on common European values and thereby tries to function as a bulwark 
against exclusionism: However, there are a number of indications that call for atten-
tion. The detrimental effect of the ECtHR jurisprudence on migrants is particularly 
apparent in the area of immigration control, where States enjoy a wide margin of 
appreciation, and where the human rights of migrants are curtailed on behalf of State 
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sovereignty.106 The European courts’ current jurisprudence does, unfortunately, not 
“offer a reliably effective venue for promoting migrant rights”.107 The fact that dis-
senting and concurring judges in separate opinions fervently urge the ECtHR to resist 
the treatment of migrants as ‘others’ in their case-law, points to the Court’s suscep-
tibility to political pressure.108 At the same time, the judges have to maintain strict 
adherence to the law under their jurisdiction only, without surrendering to (purely) 
ethical arguments, no matter how passionate they are about the matter at hand. The 
high legal standards and the legitimacy of the courts are at risk if the judges cross the 
boundaries assigned to them. It remains to be seen how the courts will manage the 
balancing act between their judicial impartiality, the expectation of the constituency, 
and the aim of being ‘the lighthouse for those who seek protection’. 
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